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UNITED STATES v. JAMES: EXPANDING THE
SCOPE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR
FEDERAL FLOOD CONTROL
ACTIVITIES
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, rooted in the feudal theory of king-
ship, effectively bars suit against the sovereign absent its consent.' The early
American judiciary accepted sovereign immunity because it feared govern-
ment would be incapable of performing its duties and functions without the
protection immunity offered.2 At the same time, it was clear that sovereign
immunity was fundamentally at odds with democratic notions of govern-
ment accountability.' Congress first acknowledged this tension when it en-
acted the Tucker Act in 1887.' The Tucker Act waived sovereign immunity
for contract and other nontort actions.5 Congress further waived sovereign
1. "Based on the medieval notion that the King can do no wrong, sovereign immunity
precludes a litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action against a sovereign
or a party with sovereign attributes unless the sovereign consents to the suit." Principe Com-
pania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Comm'rs, 333 F. Supp. 353, 355 (E.D. La. 1971); C. JACOBS,
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 151-52 (1972).
2. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868) (discussing the threat to the public ser-
vice if the sovereign could be subject to suit); Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122,
126 (1868) ("but for the protection which [sovereign immunity] affords, the government would
be unable to perform the various duties for which it was created"). In other cases, the judici-
ary contented itself with reliance on hollow justifications for sovereign immunity. See Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) ("It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examina-
tion of the reason or expediency of [sovereign immunity] .... It is enough for us to declare its
existence."). Kenneth Culp Davis, a widely recognized authority on sovereign immunity,
characterizes the rationale in support of immunity as based upon "historical accident, habit, a
natural tendency to favor the familiar, and inertia." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT
499 (3d ed. 1972).
3. The lack of sound justification for sovereign immunity in a democratic society has led
to severe criticism. "[Immunity] is an anachronistic survival of monarchical privilege, and
runs counter to democratic notions of moral responsibility of the State." Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "A basic
objection to [sovereign immunity], of course, is that the immunity doctrine, when applied,
frustrates the performance of one of the most essential government functions, the dispensation
of justice according to law .... " C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 153. For a related discussion
supporting government liability, see generally Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Posi-
tive Government Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 60 (1972).
4. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(1982)).
5. The Tucker Act is the remedy available for contract actions brought against the
United States. Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 351, 358 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965).
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immunity in 1946 when it enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).6
The FTCA subjected the United States to liability for the tortious conduct of
its employees.7
Despite federal legislation to limit sovereign immunity, the United States
continues to enjoy immunity against liability for claims relating to flood con-
trol activities.8 Historically, section 702c of the Flood Control Act of 1928
(the 1928 Act or the Flood Control Act) has barred landowners' claims for
property damage against the government. 9
In United States v. James,"° the United States Supreme Court significantly
expanded the traditional scope of section 702c immunity. The James Court
held that the scope of section 702c immunity covers not only claims of prop-
erty damage but also claims of personal injury.' I
James arose from two similar accidents at federal flood control projects.
12
The discharge of water from each of the flood control projects caused per-
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1982). The Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was enacted originally as title IV of the Legislative Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 812, 842-847. The FTCA waives
the United States' tort immunity. It states in part that "[t]he United States shall be liable,
respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). For a
discussion of litigation of tort claims against the government, see generally P. SCHUCK, SUING
GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983) and W. WRIGHT, THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (1957).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
8. The Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. § 702c (1982). Paragraph two of this sec-
tion states that:
No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any
damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place: Provided, however, That if in
carrying out the purposes of sections 702a, 702b to 702d, 702e to 702g, 702h, 702i,
702j, 702k, 7021, 702m, and 704 of this title it shall be found that upon any stretch of
the banks of the Mississippi River it is impractical to construct levees, either because
such construction is not economically justified or because such construction would
unreasonably restrict the flood channel, and lands in such stretch of the river are
subjected to overflow and damage which are not now overflowed or damaged by
reason of the construction of levees on the opposite bank of the river it shall be the
duty of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Engineers to institute proceedings
on behalf of the United States Government to acquire either the absolute ownership
of the lands so subjected to overflow and damage or floodage rights over such lands.
Id. (emphasis in original).
9. See generally infra note II and accompanying text.
10. 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986). In James, the Supreme Court first construed § 702c.
11. Id. at 3123. Prior to James, § 702c immunity had never been applied to a personal
injury claim. Federal courts have construed § 702c in 23 cases. Of these, 21 were actions
brought to recover for property damage. The remaining two were decided on other grounds.
See James v. United States, 760 F.2d 590, 599 n.16 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
3116 (1986).
12. 106 S. Ct. at 3118.
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sonal injury and death.' 3 Plaintiffs sued the United States under the
FTCA. 14 In each case, the trial court found the government negligent in
failing to warn of existing dangers.' 5 Despite the finding of negligence, the
Supreme Court invoked section 702c of the 1928 Act to bar these claims
against the government.
16
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the
two cases on appeal. 17 The Fifth Circuit, constrained by precedent, affirmed
the judgments of the lower district courts.' 8 In dictum, the court expressed
its dissatisfaction with the prior case law construing section 702c, suggesting
that the legislative history of the 1928 Act did not justify application of sec-
tion 702c immunity to personal injury claims.' 9
The Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en bane to define the scope of sover-
eign immunity under section 702c. 2' The en bane court reversed the earlier
Fifth Circuit judgment,2' rejecting section 702c immunity when the govern-
ment permits the public to enter a flood control project and negligently "cre-
ate[s] a danger or ... fail[s] to warn of a danger.
' 22
The United States Supreme Court reversed,23 holding that section 702c
immunizes the government from both property damage and personal injury
claims.24 The James majority relied upon the statutory language25 and legis-
13. The flood control project in Arkansas promoted recreational activities such as fishing,
swimming, boating, and waterskiing. Id. Four people were waterskiing without any warning
of flood control activity. Id. The strong currents created by the discharge of water pulled the
water-skiers into the reservoir's tainter gates. Id. One person drowned and two were injured.
Id.
On the Louisiana flood control project, two people fishing in a boat were unaware of ongo-
ing flood control activities. Id. at 3119. Water discharge caused the boat to become lodged in
the tainter gates. Id. One of the two boaters "was thrown into the approach basin and
drowned while being pulled through a 220-foot-long barrel." Id.
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)-2671 (1982).
15. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3118-20.
16. Id.
17. James v. United States, 740 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd on rehearing en
banc, 760 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986).
18. Id. at 373.
19. Id. at 370. Following an extensive analysis of legislative history, the court encouraged
respondents to petition for a rehearing en banc. Id. at 374.
20. James v. United States, 760 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3116
(1986).
21. Id. at 604. The en banc court of appeals believed that Congress was concerned with
shifting the costs of flood damage to property rather than shielding the government employees'
negligent acts. Id. at 599.
22. Id. at 603.
23. United States v. James, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986).
24. Id. at 3123.
25. Id. at 3121.
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lative history26 of section 702c to support its application of immunity to
personal injury claims.
The dissent in James argued that Congress, consistent with the FTCA, did
not intend the government to evade personal injury claims under section
702c. 27 To justify its conclusion that the section applies only in property
damage cases, the dissent focused on the latent ambiguity in section 702c's
language.28
This Note will review the decline of sovereign immunity in the United
States under the Tucker Act and the FTCA. It will then examine and ex-
plore the legislative history of section 702c of the Flood Control Act of 1928.
Next, the Note will examine the scope of section 702c immunity as the fed-
eral court system defined it prior to James. The Note will then analyze the
Supreme Court's decision in James to extend section 702c immunity to per-
sonal injury actions. The analysis will focus on the majority's adherence to
the "plain meaning" doctrine and its failure to interpret accurately the legis-
lative intent behind section 702c. This Note will conclude by discussing the
ramifications of James and potential models of reform for section 702c
immunity.
I. GOVERNMENT LIABILITY CLASHES WITH SECTION 702c IMMUNITY
A. Origins of Government Liability
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is rooted in the feudal theory of king-
ship.29 Its purpose is to bar an individual from bringing suit against the
sovereign, absent its consent. 30 Ratification of the eleventh amendment to
the Constitution firmly established sovereign immunity in the United
States. 3 ' The eleventh amendment provided immunity to both federal and
state governments.32
Congressional support for the doctrine of sovereign immunity waned in
the late 1800's and early 1900's. As the activities of the federal government
26. Id. at 3125.
27. Id. at 3126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens filed the dissenting opinion, in
which Justices Marshall and O'Connor joined. Id. at 3125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 3126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29. See supra note 1. For a discussion tracing the historical origins of sovereign immu-
nity, see C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 151-52.
30. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950); C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 151-52.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Prior to the passage of the eleventh amendment, the
Supreme Court expressed negative sentiments concerning sovereign immunity. See Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 456 (1793) (rejecting sovereign immunity defense as unjust
and unfair). Following the amendment's passage, the Supreme Court expressed support for
sovereign immunity. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
32. Hans, 134 U.S. at I.
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expanded, so did the number of remediless wrongs.33 Significant public out-
cry called for governmental accountability.34 In addition, Congress needed
to limit the growing number of private relief bills it faced.35 As a result,
legislative remedies were created to mitigate the consequences of sovereign
immunity.
In 1887, Congress passed the Tucker Act,36 permitting individuals to
bring suit against the federal government for private actions arising out of
contract and other nontort actions.3 7 This legislative waiver of sovereign
immunity prevented the government from "taking" private land for public
use without paying compensation. 38 Under the Tucker Act, a private land-
owner would be entitled to compensation where the "taking" was so signifi-
cant that it amounted to an implied contract to pay for the land.39 The
33. W. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 2; see also 2 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES § 52 (1986).
34. Public policy considerations that persuaded Congress to enact the FTCA included:
(1) a desire on the part of the federal government in the interests of justice and fair
play to permit a private litigant to satisfy his legal claims for injury or damage suf-
fered at the hands of a United States employee acting in the scope of his employment;
(2) the need of the Congress to be relieved of the burden imposed by multitudinous
bills for private relief arising from tort claims against government employees;
(3) the advantage of an impartial judicial forum for both the complainant and the
government in which to discover the facts in the same manner as private lawsuits;
(4) a desire of Congress to expedite the payment of just claims.
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE
TORT LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS 43 (1979); see also supra notes 1-3.
For a discussion concerning the decline of support for sovereign immunity in the federal
courts, see generally United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963) and Sovereign Immunity:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 201-05 (1970) (statement of Kenneth Culp Davis, Profes-
sor of Law, The University of Chicago).
35. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 33, § 65.01. Prior to enactment of the FTCA, the burden of
private relief bills was heavy on Congress. "Congress has so much business of a public charac-
ter that it is impossible it should give much attention to mere private claims, and their accumu-
lation is now so great that many claimants must despair of ever being able to obtain a hearing."
W. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 4. For a related discussion highlighting congressional disdain for
the heavy burden of private relief bills, see H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
36. Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982)). For an histor-
ical analysis of "takings" under the Tucker Act, see generally R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRI-
VATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491; see also Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 341 F.2d
351, 358 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965).
38. The Supreme Court has determined that if an action rises to the level of a "taking" the
federal government is required to provide compensation. Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S.
217, 224 (1904).
39. United States v. North Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 335 (1920). An
important distinction exists between a "taking," entitling a party to compensation and conse-
quential damages, and partial injury to property, not entitling a party to compensation.
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 472 (1903).
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landowner had the burden of proving that the "taking" substantially de-
prived him of the use of his property.40 This was a difficult burden to estab-
lish because the federal courts narrowly distinguished contract law and tort
law to limit government liability."' Under the Tucker Act, a landowner who
suffered property damage because of government action could not recover
compensation based on tort theory. The Tucker Act provided compensation
only where a contractual obligation could be established. 2 Nevertheless,
the Tucker Act represented one of the first significant legislative responses to
the tension created by the existence of governmental immunity in a demo-
cratic society.4 3
In 1946, Congress expanded the liability of the federal government by en-
acting the Federal Tort Claims Act.4 4 The FTCA's primary purpose was to
create a legislative remedy for the torts of federal government employees.4 5
Prompted by compelling public policy considerations of justice4 6 and private
relief bills, 47 Congress enacted the FTCA to act as a broad waiver of sover-
eign immunity.4" The FTCA went so far as to expressly repeal certain im-
munity statutes.4 9 Under the FTCA, the federal government is subject to
liability as if it were a private individual in similar circumstances.50
40. In order to constitute a "taking" that entitles a party to compensation, the value of the
property must be substantially destroyed. Lynah, 188 U.S. at 470. Under the Act, only flood-
ing that causes a permanent deprivation of land value requires compensation. Id. at 472.
41. Bedford, 192 U.S. at 224 ("A distinction has been made between damage and taking,
and that distinction must be observed in applying the constitutional provision"). The courts
could limit the federal government's liability for compensation by narrowly construing the
term "taking." See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 29-32 (1924).
42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. See generally Borchard, The Federal Tort
Claims Bill, 23 AM. J. INT'L LAW 610 (1929) (emphasizing the need for Congress to provide a
federal remedy for government caused torts); McGuire, Tort Claims Against The United
States, 19 GEO. L.J. 133 (1931) (emphasizing the need for a comprehensive federal tort claims
bill).
43. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
44. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 812,
842-47 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 2401-2402, 2411-2412, 2671-
2680 (1982)); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2674; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
48. Spelar v. United States, 171 F.2d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 1948), rev'd, 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
49. Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-24, 60 Stat. 812, 842, 846-47 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2680 (1982)).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. The FTCA is not, however, an absolute waiver of sovereign
immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 for enumerated exceptions to the FTCA. In addition, plain-
tiffs who have a remedy under the FTCA are precluded from presenting Congress with private
relief bills. 2 U.S.C. § 190(g) (1982). Prior to filing a claim under the FTCA, plaintiffs are
required to file for an administrative determination of their claims by the appropriate federal
agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). For a related discussion on the adjudication of tort claims in the
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The federal judiciary has adopted a liberal interpretation of the FTCA5'
to effectuate the public policy considerations supporting government liabil-
ity.5 2 The government has been held liable under the FTCA for major activ-
ities and functions. For example, in Dye v. United States,5 3 a case involving
facts strikingly similar to those in James,54 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held the federal government liable under the
FTCA for its negligent failure to warn boaters of a federal navigation pro-
ject's dangers.55 In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co.,56 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held the federal govern-
ment liable under the FTCA for negligence in air traffic control activities.57
Similarly, in Rayonier, Inc. v. United States,58 the Supreme Court held the
federal government liable under the FTCA for negligence in forest firefight-
ing activities.5 9 These are just a few examples6" of the courts' willingness to
subject the federal government to liability under the FTCA for high risk
federal agencies see generally Bermann, Federal Tort Claims Act At The Agency Level: The
FTCA Administrative Process, 35 CASE W. RES. 509 (1985).
51. Spelar, 171 F.2d at 209.
52. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that significant policy considerations justify
government liability. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950); see also supra notes
34-35 and accompanying text.
53. 210 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1954).
54. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. In Dye, two persons drowned when the
dam wickets on a federal navigation project opened, causing them to be swept over the dam.
210 F.2d at 124-26.
55. 210 F.2d at 128.
56. 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
57. Id. at 74.
58. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
59. Id. at 319-21.
60. The federal government has been subjected to liability under the FTCA for a broad
range of high risk activities. See, e.g., Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885, 893 (D.
Utah 1955) (federal government liable under the FTCA for negligently conducting nuclear
weapons testing), rev'd, 721 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 763 F.2d
1115 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 862 (1986); see also Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955) (federal government liable under the FTCA for the negligent
operation of lighthouse facilities); Butler v. United States, 726 F.2d 1057, 1064 (5th Cir. 1984)
(federal government liable under the FTCA for its failure to provide adequate warnings to the
public of the dangers caused in the repairs made to seawall); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v.
United States, 473 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1973) (federal government liable under the FTCA
for negligent design of a drainage ditch built in connection with an aircraft facility); Pigott v.
United States, 451 F.2d 574, 575 (5th Cir. 1971) (federal government liable for its negligence
arising out of NASA rocket launchings); Price v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (S.D.
Miss. 1981) (federal government liable under the FTCA for its negligent failure to insure pub-
lic safety at a recreational beach), modified sub nom. Butler v. United States, 726 F.2d 1057
(5th Cir. 1984). For a detailed analysis of the interplay between the FTCA and government
liability in the context of federal recreational parks, see generally Note, Protecting Visitors to
National Recreation Areas Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1792
(1984).
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activities. 6' Despite the liberal interpretation given to the FTCA by the judi-
ciary, the federal government continues to enjoy immunity from liability for
its negligence related to flood control activity.62
B. Legislative History and Purpose of the Flood Control Act of 1928
Congress enacted the Flood Control Act of 1928 in response to the grow-
ing need for adequate flood protection that existed in the early 1900's.63 Sec-
tion 702c of the 1928 Act, which provides sovereign immunity for flood
damage,64 emerged from extensive debate concerning the enormous pro-
posed cost of the Flood Control Act.65 Paragraph two of section 702c con-
sists of an immunity provision and an attached proviso.6 6 The provision
states that the United States is not liable for any damage caused by "floods"
or "flood waters.",67 The attached proviso states that where it is impractical
61. Spelar v. United States, 171 F.2d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 1948), rev'd, 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
In Spelar, the court commented:
When after many years of discussion and debate Congress has at length established a
general policy of governmental generosity towards tort claimants, it would seem that
that policy should not be set aside or hampered by a niggardly construction based on
formal rules made obsolete by the very purpose of the Act itself.
Id.
62. See United States v. James, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986); see also The Flood Control Act of
1928, 33 U.S.C. § 702c (1982); supra note 11 and accompanying text.
63. S. REP. No. 619, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1928). This report outlines in great detail
the economic history of the Mississippi River Valley.
The Mississippi River has been one of America's greatest natural resources. Id. The river
and adjoining valley region provide rich farmland, drainage, navigation, water supply, and
power. Id. at 21. The river directly provides these benefits to over 40% of the nation. Id.
In the past, the river valley has been vulnerable to destructive flooding. Id. at 22. This
flooding posed a constant threat to the benefits derived from the river. As the population and
economy of the region grew, so did the need for adequate flood protection. United States v.
Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 261 (1939). Attempts by Congress in the early 1900's to provide
this protection were insufficient. Id. The devastating flood of 1927 compelled Congress to
reaffirm the nation's dedication to providing the region with effective flood protection. The
congressional debates on the Flood Control Act of 1928 often reflected a humanitarian desire
and concern for effective flood control. For example,
those of you who just a year ago witnessed the mad rush of the mighty Father of
Waters, sweeping like a destroying angel over hundreds of proud cities ... and mil-
lions of acres of fertile fields, or who later visited the stricken area to view the scenes
of the greatest peace-time disaster this country has ever experienced, know ... the
horror and agony left in the wake of the 1927 flood.
69 CONG. REC. 6706 (1928) (statement of Rep. Gregory).
64. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c.
65. Early estimates of the cost of the project were 325 million dollars. H.R. REP. No.
1100, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1928). This cost is almost four times greater than the cost of
the Panama Canal. 69 CONG. REC. 6640 (1928) (statement of Rep. Snell).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 702c.
67. Id.
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to build flood control structures, the federal government will assume the
obligation to acquire such lands. 18 The congressional record on the immu-
nity provision is not expansive and does little to lay a foundation for an
adequate analysis of James. Rather, examination of section 702c as a whole
provides an understanding of the purpose of the immunity provision.
In conjunction, the immunity provision and the proviso of section 702c
reflect legislative concern for allocating the costs of flood control between
federal, state, and local governments.6 9 Congress sought to place a limit on
the expenditures of the federal government. 70 Despite the immunity provi-
sion, the proviso specifies those expenditures for which Congress intended
the federal government to be liable. The expenditures include construction
costs, 71 rights of way over land,72 and takings of land that are constitution-
ally required to be compensated. 73 Apart from these expenditures, the im-
munity provision shields the federal government from liability for damage
caused by flood control activities.74 Records of congressional debates reveal
that when Congress spoke of damage in this context, it referred to harm
caused to land that was not expressly excepted by the 1928 Act.7 5 Congress
inserted the sentence disclaiming liability for any damage to provide assur-
ance that the federal government would not be liable for damage to land
caused by such forces.76
68. Id.
69. James v. United States, 760 F.2d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
3116 (1986). Congress debated whether the legislation should require local contribution to the
project. See 69 CONG. REC. 7105 (1928) (statement of Rep. Tilson). Congress understood that
potential liability would attach to the entity funding the project. Congress wanted to provide
funding for the project's construction without consenting to additional government liability.
"If we go down there and furnish protection to these people-and I assume it is a national
responsibility-I do not want to have anything left out of the bill that would protect us now
and for all time to come." Id. at 6641 (statement of Rep. Snell).
70. See supra note 69.
71. H.R. REP. No. 1100, supra note 65, at 3, 12.
72. Id.
73. The "taking" issue raised concern in Congress. Congress agreed that where the fed-
eral government used or damaged land so as to constitute a constitutional "taking," the federal
government would be obligated to pay compensation. 69 CONG. REC. 7023 (1928) (statement
of Rep. Cox). Congress then went on to debate whether it had to wait until land is "taken" or
pay up front for potential "takings." Id. at 7105-06. For a discussion on the "takings" issue,
see supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
74. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c.
75. The meaning of "damage" as used in the immunity provision can be discerned by
examining a proposed amendment which adopted the same immunity provision. 69 CONG.
REC. 7028 (1928). Although the amendment was eventually rejected, debate on it defined
what Congress meant by "damage." See id. at 7022-28. The debate identifies the damage
spoken of as injury to land. Id.
76. See id. at 7026-28.
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In light of the legislative discussions and debates, it appears that Congress
intended the immunity clause and the proviso for acquiring lands to be read
together.77 Within the same discussion of section 702c, the proviso was pro-
posed as an amendment to the immunity provision, which was itself an
amendment.7s Congress considered the two together before they were
jointly passed as part of the 1928 Act, and members of Congress acknowl-
edged the close relationship between the two.
7 9
The FTCA did not exist when the Flood Control Act was drafted in
1928.80 Therefore, the federal government, shielded by sovereign immunity,
did not have to concern itself with potential tort liability. Congress was
aware that inserting the immunity clause was unnecessary, but nevertheless
wise. 8 ' Congress relied on the immunity provision to indicate that the fed-
eral government was not to pay those property damage costs not rising to
the level of a constitutional "taking.
' 82
77. Id. at 7022. The sponsor of the proviso amendment, Representative Garrett, ex-
pressly emphasized that the proviso was to be considered in conjunction with the immunity
provision. Id.
78. Id. This is the first time that the immunity provision appears in the records concern-
ing the Act. The immunity provision was an amendment proposed by Representative Reid.
Id. The proviso was proposed as an amendment to Representative Garrett's immunity provi-
sion. Id.
79. Id.
80. The FTCA was enacted by Congress as title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680).
81. Referring to the immunity provision, Representative Spearing commented that
"[w]hile it is wise to insert that provision in the bill, it is not necessary, because the Supreme
Court of the United States has decided ... that the Government is not liable for any of these
damages." 69 CONG. REC. 7028 (1928) (statement of Rep. Spearing).
The "damages" referred to by Representative Spearing were those "damages" to land that
did not rise to the level of a constitutional "taking" under the fifth amendment. See supra
notes 38 and 40 for a discussion explaining what constitutes a "taking" requiring compensa-
tion. As far as Congress was concerned, aside from construction costs and rights of way over
land, the federal government would not be liable for property damage unless the project per-
petually flooded the land. 69 CONG. REC. 7106 (1928) (statement of Rep. Cox).
82. Towards the closing of debate on the proposal to adopt § 702c as an amendment to
the Flood Control Act, Representative Cox commented:
Now, here is the meaning of this amendment: The Government may come in and
turn all of these waters into these flood ways, which will result in damage to the
owner of the property, and yet because the lands are not perpetually flooded and
therefore their value not totally destroyed, there is no taking on the part of the Gov-
ernment within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
69 CONG. REC. 7106 (1928) (statement of Rep. Cox). At the time Congress was drafting the
Flood Control Act, it was aware that a significant amount of property damage would result
from both the construction of the projects and from the sheer mechanics of using land for flood
plains. However, members of Congress emphasized that the federal government could not be
held liable for damages that were intermittent rather than permanent. Id. Evidently, § 702c
was adopted to provide assurance to skeptical members of Congress, as well as to the constitu-
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Overall, section 702c's legislative history marks a willingness and desire
on the part of Congress to create a federal flood protection plan.83 The enor-
mous cost of the plan led to congressional attempts to insure that the federal
government would not be liable for all damages to land that might result."
There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended,
or even considered, personal injuries to be included in the scope of section
702c immunity.85
C. Interpretation of Section 702c by the Federal Judiciary
1. "Broad-based" Immunity in the Federal Courts
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in James, the federal courts had
generally interpreted section 702c as providing the United States with
"broad-based" immunity. 6 In other words, the courts construed section
702c to provide absolute immunity against liability for property damage
from flood waters.8 7 Notably, before James, the federal judiciary had never
ency, that the federal government would not be plagued with massive property damage liabil-
ity. For an examination of the prevailing case law at that time construing the "taking" issue,
see supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
84. The congressional record on the 1928 Act is silent on the personal injury liability
issue. When liability is discussed, it is always done so in the context of damage to land. See,
e.g., 69 CONG. REC. 8188 (1928) (discussion of the extent of the federal government liability
for flowage rights); id. at 7024 (discussion of property damage caused by the construction of
spillways); id. at 7023 (discussion of property damage rising to the level of a constitutional
taking); id. at 6999 (discussion of property damage caused by flood ways); id. at 6712 (discus-
sion of whether the government should permit certain indirect property damage claims); id. at
5485 (discussion of how to fairly provide flowage rights and rights of way).
85. See supra note 84.
86. National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 270 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 967 (1954).
87. Id. The court believed that Congress intended, as a matter of economic policy, that
the federal government should not be liable for damage to land. Id. The court's legislative
analysis concluded that federal contribution to flood control was conditioned upon nonliability
for flood damages. Id. at 271. In addition, the National Manufacturing decision held that
§ 702c was carried forth by subsequent flood control acts so that it had nationwide application.
Id. Finally, the National Manufacturing court determined that the FTCA's enactment did not
repeal § 702c immunity. Id. at 274.
The National Manufacturing court heralded § 702c as part of Congress' fundamental policy
of providing flood control. Id. at 270.
[W]hen Congress entered upon flood control on the great scale contemplated by the
[Flood Control Act] it safeguarded the United States against liabiltiy of any kind for
damage from or by floods or flood waters in the broadest and most emphatic lan-
guage. The cost of the flood control works itself would inevitably be very great and
Congress plainly manifested its will that those costs should not have the flood dam-
ages that will inevitably recur added to them.
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construed section 702c in a personal injury context.8" Application of section
702c to actions brought to recover damage for personal injuries or death had
never been contemplated. In addition, most courts interpreted section 702c
based solely on the immunity provision without regard to the attached
proviso.8 9
In National Manufacturing Co. v. United States,9' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that section 702c provides "broad-
based" immunity. 9 ' This landmark case construed section 702c as providing
the federal government with absolute protection against liability for property
damage caused by flooding.92 Although some of the later decisions ac-
cepted, and in part expanded, the idea of "broad-based" immunity,93 they
never construed this immunity broadly enough to include personal inju-
ries.94 Case law adopting the approach set forth in National Manufacturing
does not help in determining whether section 702c immunity shields the gov-
ernment from liability for personal injury actions arising from flood control
activities.
2. The Narrowing of National Manufacturing
The concept of "broad-based" immunity9 5 has only been followed by the
88. See United States v. James, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986); see also supra note I 1 and accom-
panying text.
89. James v. United States, 760 F.2d 590, 600 n.17 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd, 106 S.
Ct. 3116 (1986).
90. 210 F.2d at 263. In National Manufacturing, plaintiffs' property was damaged when
he relied on negligent government weather forecasting. Id. at 267.
91. Id. at 270.
92. Id.
93. Several decisions have been rendered that effectively maintain or expand the "broad-
based" immunity doctrine of National Manufacturing. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States,
628 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1980) (drawing distinctions between man-made flooding and
natural flooding in order to impose liability would frustrate the government pursuit of flood
control), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981); Burlison v. United States, 627 F.2d 119, 121 (8th
Cir. 1980) (section 702c immunity applies even where sole cause of damage is government
negligence), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Taylor v. United States, 590 F.2d 263, 267 (8th
Cir. 1979) (for the purposes of § 702c immunity, no distinction should be recognized between
"backwater" and "floodwater"); Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1192
(5th Cir. 1975) (no distinction should be recognized between "washouts" and "floodwater");
Morici Corp. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 466, 481 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (no distinction should
be recognized between "seepage" and "floodwater"), aff'd, 681 F.2d 645 (1982); Sanborn v.
United States, 453 F. Supp. 651, 659 (E.D. Cal. 1977) (where a federal facility serves purposes
other than flood control, such as water storage or recreation, § 702c immunity applies if the
action causing damage was in furtherance of any of the functions).
94. See United States v. James, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986).
95. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.96 Although the remaining circuits have
not construed section 702c in a personal injury context, they have adopted a
more limiting interpretation of the section.
The Ninth Circuit created a major limitation on section 702c immunity in
Peterson v. United States. 9 7 In Peterson, plaintiffs' property was damaged
when government agents dynamited an ice jam, causing flooding.9 8 The ac-
tions by the government did not relate to any flood control activities.99
Although flood waters caused the accident," ° the court refused to apply
section 702c immunity.,Ol Unlike the Eighth Circuit in National Manufac-
turing, the Peterson court did not view section 702c as providing the federal
government absolute immunity against liability for property damage caused
by flooding unrelated to flood control project activities. 102 The court main-
tained that the legislature intended immunity to be limited to the goal sought
to be achieved; namely flood control.'0 3 The Peterson decision refused to
apply section 702c immunity where the government-caused flooding was un-
related to flood control."°
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized an-
other limitation to section 702c immunity in Lenoir v. Porters Creek Water-
shed District. 105 In Lenoir, the court held that section 702c immunity would
not apply where the sole cause of the injury was government negligence. 106
The Lenoir court avoided an overly broad interpretation of section 702c. It
reasoned that the purpose sought to be achieved by section 702c could be
satisfied if limited to instances where climatic conditions, in whole or in part,
caused flooding.'0 7 It found, however, no basis to shield the United States
from liability where government negligence caused the injury.'
08
The two limitations on section 702c immunity established in Peterson and
Lenoir reflect a judicial awareness of the tension between governmental im-
96. James v. United States, 760 F.2d 590, 601 nn.19-20 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bac), rev'd, 106
S. Ct. 3116 (1986).
97. 367 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1966).
98. Id. at 273.
99. Id. at 275.
100. Id. at 272. The blasting of the ice jam resulted in an unnatural accumulation of water,
which rushed downriver, and damaged plaintiffs' vessels. Id. at 273.
101. Id. at 276.
102. Id. at 275.
103. Id. at 275-76.
104. Id. at 275.
105. 586 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1978).
106. Id. at 1086.
107. Id.; see also Stover v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 477, 484 (N.D. Cal. 1962), aff'd, 332
F.2d 204 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 922 (1964); Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merrit Chap-
man, & Scott Corp., 126 F. Supp. 406, 408-09 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
108. Lenoir, 586 F.2d at 1086.
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munity and governmental accountability." 9 It is apparent that the circuits
do not agree as to whether section 702c provides the federal government
absolute immunity from liability for property damage caused by flood con-
trol activities. These cases are noteworthy because they limit what would
otherwise be an absolute protection against governmental liability. How-
ever, they do not dispose of the issue of whether section 702c applies to
actions brought to recover for personal injuries. Instead, in order to deter-
mine whether section 702c immunity applies to personal injury claims, it is
necessary to return to the source of the immunity provision and its legisla-
tive history.
3. The Fifth Circuit Reexamines James
The applicability of section 702c immunity to actions brought against the
government to recover for personal injuries was considered for the first time
in James v. United States. 110 In James, two recreational users of federal
flood control projects were injured and one drowned during the operation of
the projects as flood control facilities." t ' Despite the fact that the federal
government failed to provide adequate warnings to the public, 1 2 the Fifth
Circuit barred the claim based on section 702c." 3
On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed.114 No authority on
point existed in prior case law. Even those cases recognizing limitations on
the scope of section 702c immunity did not contemplate the applicability of
the section to actions arising from personal injuries caused by flood control
activities. 15 Following an extensive analysis of section 702c's legislative his-
tory and an examination of existing case law, the court decided that the
provision's immunity did not attach to "the fault of government employees
who fail to warn the public of the existence of hazards to the accepted use of
governmentally impounded water."
' 16
The en banc court began its analysis with an examination of the statutory
language." 7 It analyzed and evaluated several latent ambiguities arising
109. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
110. James v. United States, 740 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 760
F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986).
111. Id. at 367; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
113. James, 740 F.2d at 373.
114. James v. United States, 760 F.2d 590, 604 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'g 740 F.2d
365 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986).
115. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
116. James, 760 F.2d at 603. The en banc court did not preclude § 702c immunity for all
personal injury claims, only those covered by their interpretation. Id.
117. Id. at 593.
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from section 702c's language."' These ambiguities involved the precise
meaning of the terms "floodwaters," "damage," and "place. '"' 9 The court,
taking into account the legislative discussions, construed section 702c's lan-
guage as immunizing the United States against property damage claims from
the inundation of water which a flood control project could not contain.
20
The court concluded that the only reasonable expansion of the section would
be to follow the statutory language without regard to congressional intent. 121
The court determined that a strict interpretation of the letter of the statute
would result in the construction of a broader immunity provision than Con-
gress ever intended. 1
22
An additional ambiguity recognized by the en banc court was whether
immunity should apply when the water at a flood control project merely
furnishes a condition incidental to the government fault that is unrelated to
flood control. 123 For example, under section 702c, the federal government
would apparently be immune from a federal air traffic controller's negligence
that resulted in a plane crashing into a flood control project.' 24 The court
118. Id. at 593-94. The en banc court believed that the latent ambiguities they saw under-
mined the plain meaning of the statute by subjecting it to the possibility of overbroad construc-
tion. Id. at 595.
119. Id. at 594. The en banc court was not certain whether "floodwaters" meant waters
out of control or water at a flood control facility. Id. at 594 n.6. Similarly, "damage" could
have referred to land, person, or both. Id. at 594 n.7. Finally, the court found that the use of
the word "place" was unclear. Id. at 594 n.8. Damage could modify "floods" or "place."
Congress may have intended to provide immunity where floods damaged a "place." Id.
120. Id. at 595. The en banc court was concerned that the true intent of § 702c has not
been followed because interpretations had been too literal. Id. at 595 nn.9-10.
121. Id. at 595. In other words, § 702c provides "broad-based" immunity only when read
literally without regard to congressional intent. The court recognized the congressional intent
as protecting the United States from liability for certain land damages. Id. A literal reading of
§ 702c can lead to absurd results. For example, if a park ranger negligently causes a stream to
flood a campground and kill people, § 702c immunity could apply. Id. at 595. Or, suppose a
government agent on a flood control project runs his boat over a swimmer while replacing
warning buoys, § 702c could apply. James v. United States, 740 F.2d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 1984),
rev'd on rehearing en banc, 760 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986). More-
over, if the same government agent drives a jeep over a fisherman on the shore of the flood
control project, immunity may not apply. Id. The en banc court was motivated by such pos-
sibilities. James, 760 F.2d at 595.
It would be unreasonable to believe that Congress would intentionally create a statute sub-
ject to such ambiguous applications. In the past, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that it
is among its responsibilities " 'to find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be
imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the
general purpose that Congress manifested.' " Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217
(1984) (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957)).
122. James, 760 F.2d at 595.
123. Id. at 596.
124. Id. In this example, the flood water actually causing the damage to the plane was
merely incidental to government negligence unrelated to flood control. Id. A strict interpreta-
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closely examined the section's legislative history to determine Congress' pre-
cise objective. 125
The en banc court believed that the immunity clause settled the debate as
to who should bear the costs of property damage caused by flooding.' 26 The
immunity clause, adopted just prior to passage of the Flood Control Act,
disclaimed liability for property damage because of the tremendous con-
struction costs the federal government had to pay. 127 Moreover, the court
interpreted the immunity clause as repudiating the provision it super-
seded. 128 The earlier provision would have significantly increased federal
liability for property damage. 129 When Congress adopted the immunity pro-
vision, it shifted those costs associated with property damage to private indi-
viduals. 3° The court was satisfied that any latent ambiguities present in
section 702c could be resolved through reference to the purpose and intent
behind the statute.
Finally, the en banc court examined the existing case law dealing with
section 702c. It criticized the case law for interpreting the immunity provi-
sion without reference to the attached proviso."'3 The court recognized that
prior case law rendered "broad-based" interpretations because it indepen-
dently construed the immunity provision from the attached proviso. 132 Ab-
sent the attached proviso, the immunity provision appeared to broadly
disclaim all possible liability.' 33 The court disagreed with holdings support-
tion of § 702c would hold the government immune from liability for its negligence because the
damage was caused by flood waters. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c.
125. James, 760 F.2d at 596.
126. Id. at 597.
127. Id. at 598; see also 33 U.S.C. § 702c.
128. James, 760 F.2d at 598.
129. Id. The repudiated provision was criticized by members of Congress as unnecessarily
providing extraconstitutional compensation for the railroads of the Mississippi Valley region.
69 CONG. REC. 6712 (1928). "The purpose of that section is to give the railroads in the Missis-
sippi Valley an unfair and unjust advantage. If left in the bill it will make the railroads a
present of many millions of dollars over and above just compensation." Id. (statement of Rep.
Kopp). It was recognized that the language of the repudiated provision "include[d] remote
and indirect damages . . ." and thus "would lay down a broader rule of damages than the
courts have heretofore fixed." Id. (statement of Rep. Kopp). Clearly, Congress sought to limit
the liability of the federal government to those situations where a "taking" was effected.
130. James, 760 F.2d at 599. The en banc court believed that "Congress shifted most of
the risks and costs connected with flooding onto local entities and private owners, or both. It
seems doubtful that Congress intended to shield the negligent or wrongful acts of government
employees-either in the construction or in the continued operation of the Mississippi plan."
Id.
131. Id. at 600 n.17.
132. Id. at 600.
133. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c.
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ing such a "broad-based" interpretation of section 702c.' 3 4 Based upon its
legislative analysis, the court held that Congress did not intend section 702c
to provide the government with absolute immunity from personal injury
claims. 35
The court went on to analyze the case law that had introduced limited
section 702c immunity.' 36 The court realized that these limitations did not
define sufficiently the precise scope of the section. The court further limited
the scope of the immunity provision by denying application of section 702c
immunity to situations where the government permits recreational use of a
flood control project.' 3 7 The James court held that the government is im-
mune from government agents' actions that are related to flood control,' 3 8
but when recreational users are involved, the negligent failure to warn recre-
ational users of such danger on the flood control project should subject the
government to liability. ' In other words, section 702c does not create gov-
ernmental immunity from damage claims if the public is permitted on the
flood control project and is not adequately warned of danger." ° This inter-
pretation comes closest to resolving the tension between governmental im-
munity and governmental accountability.
14 1
II. UNITED STA TES v JAMES. REVIVING GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
FOR FLOOD CONTROL ACTIVITY
A. Reliance on the "Plain Meaning" Doctrine Inappropriately Preserves
"Broad-based" Immunity
In United States v. James, 142 the Supreme Court for the first time ad-
dressed the issue of sovereign immunity under section 702c. The Court con-
sidered whether section 702c of the Flood Control Act bars recovery for
personal injuries caused by the federal government's negligent failure to
134. James, 760 F.2d at 601. The en banc court concluded that "it is simply impossible 'to
accept this immunity provision, reasonably related to government involvement in flood control
programs, as an absolute insulation from liability for all wrongful acts in other situations.' "
Id. (quoting Graci v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 947, 954 (E.D. La. 1969)). As a result of its
legislative analysis, the en banc court believed that § 702c provides a much more limited scope
of immunity. Id. at 601-02.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 602; see also supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text. The en banc court
refused to follow the "broad-based" National Manufacturing immunity stance. Instead, it felt
compelled to ameliorate the rule's harshness. James, 760 F.2d at 602.




141. See supra notes 2-3.
142. 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986).
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warn recreational users of the dangers of flood control activities.' 4 3
The majority held that section 702c bars recovery for personal injury
claims.' 4  However, a sharply worded dissent maintained that the section
should not extend immunity to the United States to bar any personal injury
claims. 145
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell began the Court's section 702c
analysis by examining the statute's plain language. 146 Focusing only upon
the immunity provision, he found that the provision clearly covered the acci-
dents involved. 147 The Court understood words such as "damage," "flood,"
and "floodwaters" to be unambiguous 148 and, thus, gave effect to the plain
language of the immunity provision. 141
The majority's reliance on that interpretation of section 702c's language
raises two problems. First, the majority greatly relied upon the "plain mean-
ing" doctrine;' ° however, it failed to interpret accurately the words of the
statute. The majority found the word "damages" to be unambiguous.' It
concluded that "damages" have been "historically awarded both for injury
to property and injury to person."' 52 However, section 702c contains the
143. Id. at 3118.
144. Id. at 3125. Justice Powell delivered the majority opinion, joined by then Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. Id. at 3118.
145. Id. at 3126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Marshall and O'Connor. Id. at 3125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 3121. The majority was convinced that the plain meaning of the statute should
be given effect. Id. The Court found it unnecessary to construe the statute beyond its face.
Id.; see also infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
147. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3121.
148. Id. Contrast this interpretation with the attempt by the en banc court to provide
meaning to these words. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
149. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3121. The majority repeatedly emphasized case law that discour-
aged any judicial interpretation of a statute beyond its face. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co.
v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) ("we assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by
the ordinary meaning of the words used"); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)
("[w]hen ... the terms of a statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except 'in
rare and exceptional circumstances' " (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978))).
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (statutory interpretation
begins with "the language of the statute itself"); Rothschild v. United States, 179 U.S. 463,
465 (1900) (where the words of a statute are clear "it requires some ingenuity to create
ambiguity").
150. The "plain meaning" doctrine dictates that where the words of a statute are expressed
in "plain and unambiguous language,. . . [the] duty of the courts is to give it effect according to
its terms." United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409 (1914). The
"plain meaning" doctrine should not, however, be used when a literal construction of a statute
yields absurd results. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 204-05 (1978).
151. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3121.
152. Id.
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word "damage" and not "damages."' 5 3 The dissenting opinion sharply crit-
icized this error.'54 There is a distinct difference in meaning between "dam-
age" and "damages," as "damage" can mean "loss, injury or
deterioration."' 55 In contrast, "damages" refers to what a person receives as
"compensation in money for a loss or damage."'5 6 The majority's reliance
on the term "damages" rather than "damage" is a major oversight demon-
strating a weakness in its interpretation of section 702c.
The dissent attempted to establish that at the time the Flood Control Act
of 1928 was enacted, the accepted meaning of "damage" referred only to
injury to property. 1 57 In 1987, however, "damage" may refer to property,
personal injury, or both.' 5 ' The dissent's definition of "damage," however,
is supported by section 702c's legislative history.15 9 These records consist-
ently show that "damage" referred only to property damage 16 and never
referred to personal injury. Furthermore, Congress did not have to address
the possibility of governmental tort liability when it enacted the Flood Con-
trol Act, because the FTCA had not yet become law.16 1 The majority's con-
struction of the term "damages" to include personal injuries further weakens
153. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c.
154. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 351 (5th ed. 1979).
156. Id. In the past, the Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between "damage"
and "damages." American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 450 & n.6 (1947). In
American Stevedores, a statute used the word "damages." Id. at 450. The Court construed
"damages" to include personal injuries so as to permit suit against the federal government. Id.
The passage of the FTCA persuaded the Court to put aside the government's sovereign armor
and compel the government to accept liability for its tortious conduct. Id. at 453.
157. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent contends that
"damage" traditionally only referred to injury to property. Id. at 3126 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Rules of construction state that statutory language should be understood in light of the
time of enactment. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 122 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir.
1941). An early edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary, relied upon by the dissent, James, 106 S.
Ct. at 3126 (Stevens, J., dissenting), suggests that some English courts did not recognize "dam-
age" as describing an action brought to recover for personal injuries. BoUVIER's LAW DIC-
TIONARY 749 (1914). An early edition of Black's Law Dictionary, however, does not recognize
any distinction in "damage" as to personal or property injury. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
313 (2d ed. 1910). Evidently, the context in which the word is used must be considered.
The dissent held that the majority had no basis on which to conclude that the term "dam-
age" included personal injuries. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3127 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "If 'plain
meaning' is our polestar, the immunity provision does not bar respondents' personal injury
suits." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. There is no indication in the congressional records that when Congress spoke of
"damage" it was referring to personal injuries. For examples of the context in which Congress
used the word "damages," see supra note 84.
160. See supra note 84.
161. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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its interpretation of the immunity provision. 16 2
The majority's attempt to ascribe meaning to the plain language of the
statute gave rise to yet another error. The majority attempted to interpret
section 702c by analyzing only the immunity provision without regard to the
accompanying proviso for acquisition of certain lands.' 6 ' Reading the im-
munity provision of section 702c in conjunction with the attached proviso,
as suggested by the dissent,' 64 reveals that the immunity provision serves to
bar only certain types of property damage claims against the federal govern-
ment. The majority rejected this reading of the statute, 165 and erroneously
maintained that the provision and the proviso were to be interpreted
separately. 1
66
As the dissent observed, the two clauses were in fact closely connected.
167
As indicated by the legislative history, Congress intended the proviso to
serve as an authorization for governmental compensation of property dam-
age while the immunity provision limits that authorization. 168 When read
separately, the immunity provision appears unambiguous and broad. How-
ever, in conjunction with the proviso, the immunity provision serves as a
limitation on the compensation for property damage authorized in the sec-
tion as a whole.1
69
The majority failed to discern the relationship between the immunity pro-
vision and the attached proviso of section 702c from its analysis of the sec-
tion's legislative history.170 The majority began its analysis by reviewing the
disastrous effects of flooding and identifying congressional concern for pro-
viding widespread flood protection. 17 1 It recognized that Congress added
section 702c to the Flood Control Act in order to limit the federal govern-
ment's financial liability for flood control project construction and operation
162. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
163. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3121; see also 33 U.S.C. § 702c. In fact, the majority considered
taking the proviso into account but decided against it. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3123-24. Under
rules of statutory construction, provisos should be interpreted as restricting or qualifying the
effect of the language of the provision to which it is attached. Calvin Tomkins Co. v. Clifford
F. MacEvoy Co., 137 F.2d 565, 568 (3rd Cir. 1943), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Clifford
F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102 (1944). Congress was well aware of this rule of
construction. See generally supra note 77.
164. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 3123.
166. Id. Evidently, the majority concluded that no relationship existed between the immu-
nity provision and the attached proviso without examining comprehensively the legislative
records.
167. Id. at 3127 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra note 78.
168. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
169. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 3122.
171. Id.; see also supra note 63.
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costs. 17 2 However, assuming that the immunity provision was intended to
be read along with the proviso, the congressional concern over these costs
seems limited to property damage. The proviso recognizes that the federal
government will compensate for certain damage to property.' 7 3 Aside from
these isolated examples, the federal government refused to accept liability for
any other land damage.' 74 The majority did not reach this conclusion be-
cause it chose not to read the immunity provision along with the attached
proviso. 175
The dissent suggested that section 702c's legislative history reflects a con-
gressional desire to invoke immunity as a bar to governmental liability for
certain types of property damage.' 7 6 Given the section's language and con-
gressional debates concerning it, the more plausible interpretation of section
702c immunity is that it applies to property damage. The legislative history
shows congressional concern with the various costs associated with the "tak-
ing" and the damaging of property.177 The congressional debates reveal a
humanitarian desire to provide relief from devastating floods. 178 This obvi-
ous humanitarian concern is in sharp contrast with the minimal legislative
reference to the immunity provision. If Congress ascribed great importance
to the immunity provision, the dissent noted, one would expect that it would
have been more thoroughly debated.179 The principle intent of Congress to
provide relief should not be circumscribed by an interpretation unsupported
by evidence or reason.'8 ° The immunity provision can be most reasonably
understood as limiting the compensation authorized in the attached
proviso. 181
The majority rejected an argument that would have narrowed the scope of
section 702c immunity to flood control activities' 8 2 and subjected govern-
ment agents to potential tort liability under the FTCA for actions diverging
172. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3123.
173. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c.
174. See James, 106 S. Ct. at 3128 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 169 and
accompanying text.
175. See James, 106 S. Ct. at 3128 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 163-66 and
accompanying text.
176. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3127 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 77-78.
177. See supra notes 81-84.
178. See supra note 63.
179. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. A similar analysis of legislative history, in a different context, was proffered by Judge
Starr in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Donovan, 766 F.2d 1550, 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The immu-
nity provision takes on even less importance considering passage of the FTCA.
181. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 3124.
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from the ordinary scope of flood control activities. 183 Respondents argued
that their injuries resulted from the government's mismanagement of recrea-
tional activities."' The majority disagreed, refusing to narrow the scope of
section 702c immunity because it categorized the management of recrea-
tional activities as the management of the flood control activities.18 5 By re-
fusing to limit the scope of immunity, the majority facilitated federal pursuit
of flood control activities unfettered by potential liability. The desirability of
immunity depends upon the necessity of accepting liability without forfeiting
the pursuit of flood control. Supporters of the FTCA suggest that immunity
unnecessarily shields the federal government's wrongful acts because ample
resources exist to compensate for its negligence.1
8 6
Finally, the majority rejected respondent's argument that section 702c was
enacted only to counteract the costs arising from liability for certain damage
to property.'8 7 This argument, supported by both the en banc court of ap-
peals' 88 and the dissent,"' would hold the government liable for personal
injuries caused by negligent failure to warn the public of danger.' 90 In re-
jecting this argument, the majority once again emphasized that Congress
intended to protect the federal government with broad immunity.' 9' The
majority conceded that the congressional record referred only to liability for
property damage, but concluded that such references were only "fragments
of legislative history."' 9 2 This conclusion lacks justification as the legislative
183. Id. This was essentially the same argument proffered by the en banc court. See James
v. United States, 760 F.2d 590, 603 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986).
Cases decided subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in James, however, have limited the
scope of § 702c immunity by drawing a distinction between government negligence pursuant
to flood control purposes and nonflood control purposes. Pueblo de Cochiti v. United States,
647 F. Supp. 538, 539-42 (D.N.M. 1986); Denham v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 1021, 1025-
27 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
184. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3124. The "mismanagement" described by respondents was the
government's negligence in failing to warn of dangers. Id.; see also supra notes 12-15 and
accompanying text.
185. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3124.
186. Engdahl, supra note 3, at 60. "The urgent fiscal necessities that made government
immunity acceptable at the outset are no longer present .... The United States and a growing
number of states have found it financially feasible for them to accept liability for and consent
to suit upon claims of negligence . Id.
187. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3125.
188. James v. United States, 760 F.2d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
3116 (1986).
189. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 3125.
191. Earlier portions of the majority opinion reflect the judicial disposition towards
"broad-based" immunity. Id. at 3123 ("the sweeping language of § 702c was no drafting inad-
vertence"). For a discussion of § 702c's "broad-based" immunity, see generally supra notes
86-109 and accompanying text.
192. James, 106 S. Ct. at 3125.
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history is replete with discussions and debates concerning where the burden
of property damage should lie.' 93 In fact, most of the legislative history of
section 702c and the 1928 Act discusses potential liability for property dam-
age.' 94 It does not seem fair to ignore this by merely labeling such evidence
"fragments." The majority's adherence to the "plain meaning" doctrine pre-
vents it from considering the legislative history behind section 702c, which
indicates that Congress never considered personal injury in its attempt to
shield the government from property damage liability caused by flood con-
trol measures. Rather, the legislative history indicates that Congress, as a
policy decision, chose to enact section 702c to clarify and assign the poten-
tial liabilities associated with "takings" of land.' 95 Accordingly, the section
would save the federal government from liability for mere damage to land
and impose liability only when land was "taken.
' 196
B. Judicial and Legislative Models of Reform for Section 702c
1. The Need for Judicial Narrowing of James
In James, the Supreme Court concluded that section 702c of the Flood
Control Act of 1928 provides the federal government with sovereign immu-
nity for both personal injury and property damage claims arising out of flood
control activities. " Although this decision conforms with the "plain mean-
ing" of the immunity provision,' 98 it conflicts with the legislative intent be-
hind the provision's enactment. 99 As a result, the majority's decision is
unnecessarily broad.
The legislative history reveals that Congress drafted section 702c to pro-
vide the federal government with immunity from property damage claims
arising out of flood control activities. 2" The fact that the FTCA never ex-
193. See supra notes 69, 73, 82 & 84, and accompanying text. The soundness of the major-
ity's interpretation is further weakened by its failure to examine the immunity provision within
the context of the congressional debate from which it arose. In 1928, Congress expressed a
serious concern over whether the federal government could be held liable for "takings" of land
when they embarked upon flood control. See supra note 82. Congress examined and discussed
the state of "takings" law in 1928, and the extent to which sovereign immunity would provide
the federal government with protection against liability for the anticipated damages to land.
Id. It is erroneous to conclude that Congress intended, expressly or impliedly, to enact § 702c
to immunize the government against liability from personal injury claims.
194. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 81 & 193 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
197. United States v. James, 106 S. Ct. 3116, 3123 (1986).
198. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
200. Id.
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pressly repealed section 702c 20 1 merely indicates that the federal government
continues to enjoy immunity from such property damage claims. Thus, the
Supreme Court could appropriately limit the holding of James so that the
scope of the section's immunity only applies to the extent of property dam-
age claims. As the dissent concludes,2"2 such a limitation would more accu-
rately reflect the intent of Congress. The majority's failure to recognize that
section 702c grants less than absolute immunity to the government appears
to demonstrate the Court's reluctance to break away from the deeply rooted
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 0 3 Although the majority does not praise
the precepts of sovereign immunity, it does little to mitigate the unjust and
inequitable doctrine. 20 4 The Court's overly broad interpretation of section
702c inappropriately preserves governmental immunity.
2. The Need for Congressional Response
The James decision, providing the federal government with broad immu-
nity from claims related to flood control activities, 2° 5 creates a public policy
offending the contemporary values of government accountability and re-
sponsibility. 206 Additionally, a policy of broad government immunity is
likely to tax congressional resources by pressuring Congress to consider pri-
vate relief bills. 207 At a minimum, Congress should amend section 702c in
order to allow private parties to bring personal injury claims arising from
governmental flood control activities. This would permit the section to func-
tion as Congress originally intended.20 8 Such a limiting construction of the
immunity provision could help eliminate some of the harshness of sovereign
immunity as well as encourage government responsibility by insisting upon
accountability.20 9
Moreover, because governmental immunity no longer serves any vital na-
201. National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 274 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 967 (1954); see also supra note 82.
202. United States v. James, 106 S. Ct. 3116, 3127-29 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
204. If the majority had adopted the comprehensive analysis of the legislative history relied
upon by the dissent, 106 S. Ct at 3127 (Stevens, J., dissenting), rather than relying on the
"plain meaning" doctrine, id. at 3121, it would not have easily upheld such a broad application
of sovereign immunity, and recovery for at least personal injury might have been permitted
under the FTCA.
205. Id. at 3123.
206. See supra notes 3 & 34, and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 35.
208. This construction of § 702c would continue to bar claims by private individuals for
property damage arising out of governmental flood control activities. See generally supra notes
170-81 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 3 & 34.
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tional purpose, Congress should consider repealing section 702c altogether.
In its time, the Flood Control Act of 1928 was one of the largest and most
expensive projects undertaken by the federal government. 210 To some ex-
tent, Congress based its support for the flood control project on the belief
that its expenditures would not be increased by judgments for property dam-
age.21 Since 1928, however, the activities of the federal government have
dramatically expanded to include major undertakings ranging from air traf-
fic control to rocket launching.212 Unlike negligence in flood control, liabil-
ity attaches to the federal government for its negligence in connection with
such activities.21 3 Yet, flood control is not so distinguishable from these
other government activities as to warrant granting sovereign immunity's
unique protections. Congress should repeal section 702c in order to provide
private individuals a remedy under the FTCA for both personal injury and
property damage claims. Congress should respond promptly where, as here,




Section 702c of the Flood Control Act of 1928 immunizes the United
States from liability for damage claims arising from federal flood control
activities. The section has traditionally barred individual landowners' ac-
tions for the recovery of property damage. The Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. James not only affirms the traditional application of section
702c immunity, but also extends it by prohibiting personal injury actions
brought against the federal government. The decision has increased the abil-
ity of the United States to pursue flood control activities unfettered by the
constraints of potential liability for tortious conduct.
The James Court adhered to the "plain meaning" of the Flood Control
Act of 1928 in order to support broad powers of sovereign immunity. This
210. See supra notes 63 & 65.
211. See supra note 82.
212. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 2 (public policy considerations justifying government liability). Public
policy values supporting government liability are inconsistent with the line of case law holding
that § 702c immunizes the federal government from liability for its negligent actions related to
flood control activities. See generally James v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986). In up-
holding the immunity provision in § 702c, despite its lack of justification, the federal judiciary
has drawn attention to one of the few remaining vestiges of sovereign immunity in the United
States. Section 702c immunity should be repealed in its entirety. Congress has yet to show the
intent or justification for § 702c so as to distinguish it from similar government activities that
receive no immunity. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. Until such justification is
provided, it would be inappropriate to hold the federal government immune from tort liability.
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interpretation of section 702c does not permit the vindication of just claims
against the federal government for the tortious conduct of its employees.
Sovereign immunity under section 702c is incompatible with the modern
principles of justice and responsibility inherent under the FTCA. The
Court's decision in James to perpetuate sovereign immunity does violence to
the congressional intent behind the FTCA. Congress should act promptly to
address the public policy concerns raised by James.
Michael S. Levine
